300 words about Justice as a Virtue

Justice as a Virtue
History
The idea of social justice is based in a social contract; the republics individual justice is distinctively virtue ethical.
Plato understands individual justice on analogy with justice, he views the state as a kind of organism and justice individuals is not thought of as primarily involving conformity to just institutions and laws.
Rather the just individual is someone whose soul is guided by the vision of good.
Aristotle is generally regarded as a virtue ethicist; it anchors individual justice in situational factors. Aristotle treats all individual virtues as leaned dispositions
Both Plato and Aristotle were rationalist as regards both human knowledge and moral reasons.
Much subsequent thinking about justice was influenced by Plato and Aristotle and emphasized the role of reason.
Hume saw that individual justice at least sometimes conflicts with what motivates us to do.
Hume seeks to explain moral judgment and a sense of duty based in such judgment in terms of the same mechanisms of sympathy that operate within and through the natural virtues.

Rationalism and Justice
Rawls's positive view of justice is concerned primarily with the justice of institutions or the "basic structure" of society: justice as an individual virtue is derivative from justice as a social virtue defined via certain principles of justice.
Rawls argues that a utilitarian principle of justice dictating simply the maximization of overall social well-being would not be accepted in his original position and is accordingly less plausible than the conception of justice embodied in his own two principles and the construction that leads to them.
Rawls, individual justice is theoretically derivative from social justice because the just individual is to be understood as someone with an effective or "regulative" desire to comply with the principles of justice.
This makes the individual virtue of justice an artificial one in Hume's sense, but, in part because he doesn't assume virtue ethics, Rawls doesn't get caught up in the Human circle.
Stages of Moral development
Rawls is far from the only thinker to conceive of moral development han rationalist views like Rawls's and Kant's, and utilitarian’s have naturally called into question the objectivity and intellectual fairness of Kohlberg's account.
The evidence for Kohlberg's stage sequence was drawn from studies of boys, and when one applies the sequence to the study of young girls, it turns out that girls on average end up at a less advanced stage of moral development than boys do.
Carol Gilligan responded to Kohlberg's views by questioning whether a theory of moral development based solely on a sample of males could reasonably be used to draw conclusions about the inferior moral development of women. Gilligan argued that her own studies of women's development indicated that the moral development of girls and women proceeds and ends in a different fashion from that of boys and men, but that that proves nothing about inferiority or superiority:
Gilligan claimed that women tend to think morally in terms of connection to others and in terms of caring about those with whom they are connected; men, by contrast and in line with Kohlberg's studies, tend to think more in terms of general principles of justice and of individual rights against other people.
Caring and justice
He primary fulcrum for articulation of any ethic of caring seems to lie in an ideal that stresses connection over separateness.
However, an ethic of caring doesn't favor social conservatism in the way much communitarian thought does: any social structure that shows insufficient concern for one group or another can arguably be criticized via the ideal of mutual caring.)
Ethic of justice and rights tells us to regulate our actions or lives in accordance with certain general moral principles (or explicitly moral insights), whereas the ethic of caring stresses the good of a concern for the welfare of others
Normal human caring isn't impartial
There are many different conceptions of the virtue of justice, and only some of them are distinctively virtue ethical. Many non-virtual ethical approaches put forward theories of virtue, and what distinguishes them from virtue ethics is that the given theory of virtue comes later in the order of explanation, rather than itself serving as the basis for understanding (all of) morality. Rawls's conception of justice as an individual virtue is a good example of a non-virtue-ethical account of a virtue.

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